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Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argue that investors who suﬀer from inﬂa-
tion illusion price assets as if real payoﬀs are discounted at the nominal in-
terest rate. They use this idea to rationalize the stock market slump of the
1970s, which coincided with high inﬂation and high nominal interest rates.
More recently, inﬂation illusion has again become a prominent theme in
the ﬁnancial press because the 2000s housing boom coincides with low in-
ﬂation and low nominal interest rates.1However, an early critique of the in-
ﬂation illusion hypothesis (Summers 1983) points out that the 1970s saw a
housing boom coincide with high nominal interest rates. International ev-
idence presented in the following points to a more general stylized fact: in
many countries, house-price booms occurred in the high-inﬂation 1970s
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1. For example, see Pam Woodall’s survey on world property markets in the Economist on
March 29, 2003. The article “Castles in Hot Air” in this report and an earlier article, “Going
through the Roof” in the Economist on March 28, 2002, argue that inﬂation illusion fuels the
recent house-price boom.In this chapter, we consider the eﬀect of inﬂation illusion on asset prices
in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. The key as-
sumptions are that (1) agents who suﬀer from inﬂation illusion interact with
“smart” agents in markets for nominal credit instruments, and (2) borrow-
ing must be backed by real estate. We show under these assumptions that
nominal interest rates move with smart agents’ inﬂation expectations, and
housing booms occur whenever these expectations are either especially high
or low. Moreover, the housing boom is stronger when credit markets are
more developed, which suggests that recent ﬁnancial development may
have increased the potential for inﬂation illusion to drive house prices.
We are led to consider investor heterogeneity because we want our
model to account for movements in nominal interest rates. In the data,
nominal rates comove with measures of expected inﬂation, which suggests
that at least some investors are aware of the distinction between real and
nominal rates. For example, even if stock prices were low in the high inﬂa-
tion 1970s because illusionary investors were discounting at high nominal
rates, someone must have also priced high inﬂation expectations into nom-
inal rates. In our model, there are smart investors who understand the
Fisher equation: bond returns are given by the nominal interest rate minus
expected inﬂation. At the same time, there are illusion investors who be-
lieve that all changes in nominal rates reﬂect changes in real interest rates.
The equilibrium nominal interest rate then moves—typically less than one
for one—with changes in smart investors’ inﬂation expectations.
The key eﬀect in the model is that illusionary and smart investors dis-
agree about real interest rates when smart investors’ inﬂation expectations
are either especially high or low. In either case, disagreement generates in-
creased borrowing and lending among households as well as a house-price
boom. To see how disagreement about real rates obtains, assume ﬁrst that
smart investors’ inﬂation expectations rise above the historical mean and
thus drive up nominal interest rates. Illusionary investors attribute any in-
crease in nominal rates to an increase in real rates. As a result, they end up
perceiving higher real rates than smart investors. In contrast, if smart in-
vestors have unusually low inﬂation expectations and drive down nominal
rates, illusionary investors perceive lower real rates than smart investors.
Disagreement about real interest rates generates house-price booms if
borrowing must be backed by real estate. Indeed, increased credit market
activity raises the demand for collateral, which in turn drives up house
prices. More speciﬁcally, our model generates two scenarios for a housing
boom, illustrated in ﬁgure 4.1. The scenarios diﬀer in which group of
households perceives lower real rates and thus drives up house prices. In a
low inﬂation environment, such as the 2000s, the increased demand for
housing and mortgages is due to illusionary agents, who mistake low nom-
inal rates for low real rates, while smart investors are happy to invest in
bonds. In times of high expected inﬂation, such as the 1970s, the roles of
148 Monika Piazzesi and Martin Schneiderthe two groups are reversed: smart investors borrow and shift their portfo-
lio toward real estate, while illusion agents are deterred from mortgages
and housing, by high nominal rates.
The mechanism we emphasize works only if housing serves as collateral.
If borrowing was not possible, disagreement about real interest rates would
lead some agents to rebalance their portfolios from housing toward bonds
and other agents to shift funds in the opposite direction. It is then not ob-
vious why house prices should increase; indeed, in our model, they remain
unchanged. However, if agents who perceive low real rates can build lever-
aged portfolios, thus investing more than their own wealth in housing, dis-
agreement raises the demand for housing suﬃciently to generate a boom.
Moreover, the eﬀect is stronger the more borrowers can leverage their port-
folios: in the model, the equilibrium house price is increasing in the maxi-
mal loan-to-value ratio. More generally, broader access to credit and lower
transaction costs in the credit market can be expected to work in the same
direction.
While our model is motivated by disagreement about real interest rates
that emerges because some investors suﬀer from inﬂation illusion, our for-
mal analysis only assumes that investors disagree about the real payoﬀ
on nominal bonds. The theoretical eﬀect we highlight is thus more general
and could apply in situations where disagreement derives from other
sources of heterogeneity. One example is diﬀerences in tax rates: investors
in high tax brackets perceive a lower real return on bonds—and, if interest
is tax deductible, a lower cost of borrowing—than investors in lower
brackets. Another source of disagreement about real rates is diﬀerences in
inﬂation expectations. This is considered in Piazzesi and Schneider (2006),
where we use inﬂation surveys to document diﬀerences in expected inﬂa-
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Fig. 4.1 Housing booms under diﬀerent inﬂation scenariostion rates across age cohorts in the 1970s and quantify the eﬀect of such
diﬀerences for house and stock price movements at that time.
We have described illusionary investors as investors who mistake
changes in nominal interest rates for changes in real rates. This mistake
does not require investors to be unaware of inﬂation or to be wrong about
the inﬂation rate. All that matters is that investors confuse real and nomi-
nal returns when making portfolio choice decisions. For example, consider
an illusionary investor who compares the utility he obtains from buying a
home to the nominal cost of borrowing. This investor agrees with his smart
neighbor about expected inﬂation. However, the diﬀerence between the
two neighbors is that the smart neighbor actually uses the expected inﬂa-
tion rate to compute the real cost of his mortgage. Indeed, disagreement
about real interest rates does not require disagreement about inﬂation—
diﬀerences in agents’ understanding of the impact of inﬂation on returns 
is enough.2
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the empirical implications
of inﬂation illusion in equity and real estate markets. Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004) decompose the dividend yield on stocks into three
components: expected dividend growth, a subjective risk premium (iden-
tiﬁed from a cross-sectional regression), and a “mispricing term.” They
show that positive correlation of dividend yields with inﬂation is mostly
due to the mispricing term. This indicates that stocks are undervalued by
conventional measures when inﬂation is high.3 Brunnermeier and Julliard
(2006) examine the relationship between house prices and inﬂation. They
derive a decomposition for the price-rent ratio, that is, the price-dividend
ratio on housing. Using data from the U.K. housing market, they con-
struct a mispricing component of the price-rent ratio that is negatively re-
lated to inﬂation. By their measure, houses thus appear overvalued when
inﬂation is low.
There are few formal models of inﬂation illusion. The so-called Fed
model, widely used by practitioners, is sometimes used to motivate a mo-
notonic relationship between asset prices and inﬂation. According to the
Fed model, inﬂation illusion leads investors to apply a modiﬁed Gordon
growth formula to determine the price-dividend ratio on long-lived assets:
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2. This observation implies that we cannot derive evidence about illusion or the fraction of
illusionary agents in the population from inﬂation surveys. In particular, many investors may
suﬀer from inﬂation illusion today, even though the Michigan inﬂation survey does not indi-
cate much inﬂation disagreement during the 2000s. It is an open and interesting question how
we can design surveys (e.g., about mortgage planning) that are able to distinguish between il-
lusion and disagreement.
3. Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2005) study the cross section of stock returns and show
that capital asset pricing model (CAPM) betas decrease with the inﬂation rate. This ﬁnding is
also consistent with inﬂation illusion; when inﬂation is high, the compensation for each unit
of market beta is lower than what the overall diﬀerence in stock returns and riskless securities
would suggest.instead of using the real interest rate to discount future (real) cash ﬂows as
in the usual formula, investors discount at the nominal rate. The modiﬁed
formula is useful for thinking about stocks that appear undervalued in the
1970s and overvalued in the 1990s.4 Its application to the housing market,
however, runs into Summers’s critique—house prices should be low to-
gether with stock prices in the 1970s.
The Fed model does not deliver a complete account of asset prices under
inﬂation illusion because it takes the nominal interest rate as exogenous. It,
therefore, sidesteps the question why nominal rates comove with expected
inﬂation. In contrast, our general equilibrium model of inﬂation illusion 
determines the nominal rate endogenously and links it to smart investors’
inﬂation expectations. In addition, our model is not subject to the Sum-
mers’s critique. Indeed, inﬂation illusion matters in our model when inﬂa-
tion is far from its historical mean in either direction, and it induces a non-
monotonic relationship between mispricing in the housing market and
inﬂation. The inﬂation illusion hypothesis is thus consistent with housing
booms not only in the low-interest 2000s but also in the high-interest 1970s.
Basak and Yan (2005) also consider a general equilibrium model in which
preferences of illusion investors are deﬁned over nominal consumption.
With power utility, investors who expect high inﬂation thus eﬀectively dis-
count the future at a lower (higher) rate if the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is larger (smaller) than one and interest rates reﬂect these pref-
erences. Our approach diﬀers in its emphasis on heterogeneity and housing
as collateral (as in Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). Moreover, the preferences 
of illusion investors in our model do not depend on expected inﬂation.
The purpose of this chapter is to isolate the eﬀects of inﬂation illusion on
house prices and interest rates in general equilibrium; we thus abstract
from many other factors that matter for asset prices. In particular, we do
not consider other possible links between inﬂation and house-price booms.
Feldstein (1980) has shown that the tax treatment of houses and mortgages
makes housing a more attractive asset when expected inﬂation is high. On
the one hand, inﬂation increases taxable nominal capital gains, which are
more easily sheltered from tax for housing than for, say, equity. On the
other hand, the inﬂation increases tax-deductible nominal mortgage inter-
est and thus lowers the eﬀective cost of borrowing.5
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents cross-country
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4. Ritter and Warr (2002), Sharpe (2002), and Asness (2003) document that dividend yields
on stocks are indeed highly correlated with nominal interest rates.
5. There is an interesting connection between this second eﬀect and our analysis. When
smart investors are in diﬀerent tax brackets, an increase in expected inﬂation will make the
eﬀective costs of borrowing computed by Feldstein more diﬀerent across households. Agents
thus disagree more about (after-tax) real rates when inﬂation is high. Through the mechanism
described in the preceding, this should generate further upward pressure on house prices:
agents in high tax brackets would ﬁnd it cheaper to take out a mortgage and drive up house
prices, while agents in low tax brackets would be happy to lend.evidence on price-rent ratios, using various house-price measures. Section
4.3 presents our heterogeneous agent model with inﬂation illusion. Section
4.4 describes equilibrium housing booms in high and low inﬂation envi-
ronments. Section 4.5 explains how these equilibria capture the historical
experience of the 1970s and 2000s. Section 4.6 concludes and discusses fu-
ture research. Proofs are collected in the appendix.
4.2 Cross-Country Evidence
We construct an annual cross-country data set for the period 1970 to
2004. This sample period is dictated by the availability of house-price data.
The data set covers twelve countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,
and United States.
4.2.1 Price-Dividend Ratios for Stocks
To measure the price-dividend ratio for stocks, we rely on Morgan-
Stanley Country Indexes available from the Web site www.msci.com. For
each country, we obtain two annual series, labeled “price index” (PI) 
and “gross index” (GI), and compute the dividend yield as (GIt/Gt–1)/
(PIt/PIt–1) – 1. This procedure recovers a price-dividend ratio with inter-
pretable units. For example, the average PD-ratios in the United States
and the United Kingdom were 35.9 and 26, respectively, over the 1970 to
2004 period.
4.2.2 Price-Rent Ratios for Houses
The measurement of price-dividend ratios for housing, or price-rent ra-
tios, is more diﬃcult because houses do not trade on exchanges like stocks.
We have two options—data from national accounts or data on price in-
dexes constructed by the national central banks available through the Bank
of International Settlements (BIS). For the national accounts, we follow
the methodology in Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007). We measure the
numerator as the value of the aggregate residential housing stock and the
denominator as aggregate expenditures on housing services, including
owner-estimated rents. We have data from national accounts for the United
States and the United Kingdom. Based on price indexes constructed by the
national central banks, we measure the national residential price index di-
vided by the consumer price index for each country. These data are avail-
able from the BIS. To measure real rents, we use the rent component of
each country’s consumer price index available from Datastream and divide
by the consumer price index.6
152 Monika Piazzesi and Martin Schneider
6. There are two missing observations in the BIS data set. First, we interpolate the 2004 ob-
servation for Ireland using data from the Annual Housing Statistics Bulletin published by theNational account data have several advantages. First, the resulting
price-rent ratios have meaningful units because the numerator and de-
nominator are measured in dollars. For example, the average price-rent ra-
tios in the United States and the United Kingdom over the 1970 to 2004 pe-
riod were 17.6 and 26.5, respectively. In contrast, the units of PD-ratios
based on house price and rent indexes are not meaningful; the ratios are
normalized to 1 in some base year (which is 1985 in ﬁg. 4.2). The ratios are
only useful for looking at percentage changes over time.
Second, the price-rent ratios from national accounts do not involve any
quality judgements. Again, the reason is that they are measured in dollars.
In contrast, an index construction tracks the evolution of the purchase or
rental value of an appropriately deﬁned “unit of housing.” The deﬁnition
of “one unit” of housing does not only involve the square footage of living
space but also quality changes of that space over time. The quality judge-
ments are especially problematic for price-rent ratios because the numera-
tor and denominator are constructed by diﬀerent agencies that may use
diﬀerent deﬁnitions.
We can correct for quality changes at low frequencies by taking out
linear time trends from real rents in the denominator. We will plot the re-
sulting corrected ratios as dotted lines in our ﬁgures. Examples of such
low-frequency changes in quality are modern amenities—such as air con-
ditioning, central heating, and electricity—which were absent from homes
a century ago. Today’s homes also beneﬁt from infrastructure in cities—
such as roads, sidewalks, and public transportation—which has improved
slowly over time. However, correcting linear time trends does not take into
account high-frequency changes in quality such as quality variations of
homes traded over the business cycle or shifting neighborhood eﬀects.
Finally, price-rent ratios from national accounts are available for a long
time period, while most house price indexes start in the 1970s. In this chap-
ter, we do not exploit this advantage of the national accounts data, because
we focus on stock and house price movements around the high-inﬂation
episode in the 1970s and the recent low-inﬂation episode.
4.2.3 Inﬂation and Real Interest Rates
For each country, we obtain annual consumer-price inﬂation and the
three-month nominal interest rate on government bonds from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics database.
We construct the ex post real rate as the diﬀerence between the nominal
rate and the inﬂation rate.
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Irish Department of the Environment, Heritage, and Local Government. Second, we inter-
polate the 1970 observation for Spain, assuming that real house price growth is equal to real
rent growth for that year.4.2.4 Cross-Country Empirical Facts
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the price-dividend ratios of houses and stocks
together with inﬂation and the real rate for each country. The PD-ratios of
houses in ﬁgure 4.2 are measured with BIS data, while those in ﬁgure 4.3
are from national accounts. We focus on two episodes. During the inﬂation
episode of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the PD-ratio of housing was rel-
atively high, while the PD-ratio of stocks was relatively low. During the dis-
inﬂation episode of the 2000s, the same situation emerges. Moreover, ex
post real rates were low, or even negative, during both episodes.
4.3 The Model
Our model describes heterogeneous households, some of whom may su-
ﬀer from inﬂation illusion. Households trade real estate and nominal as-
sets (bonds) with each other as well as a “rest of the economy” sector. Real
estate is an asset that cannot be sold short but that can be used as collat-
eral. Bonds are special because they promise nominal payoﬀs and because
they can be held in negative quantities.
4.3.1 Setup
There are two dates, 0 and 1, and one consumption good. There is a unit
mass of risk-neutral households who discount date 1 consumption by the
factor  . Households can invest in nominal bonds and real estate. A unit
of real estate (or “houses”) trades at the price p at date 0 and is expected to
pay oﬀp at date 1. This payoﬀequals the resale price of the house plus any
dividend from housing (which may include utility from ownership, etc.)
Real estate cannot be sold short. Households can buy or sell one-period
nominal bonds. If they choose to borrow by issuing bonds, they must re-
spect a collateral constraint: the value of the bonds issued must be less than
  times the value of their house. The parameter   is the maximal loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio.
Nominal bonds trade at a price 1/Rat date 0, where Ris the (gross) nom-
inal interest rate from date 0 to date 1. Households expect the nominal
bond to pay oﬀ x goods at date 1. The expected payoﬀ x is subjective and
may be diﬀerent for smart investors and illusionary households. For smart
households who understand the Fisher equation and expect inﬂation  , the
expected payoﬀ of a nominal bond is x   1/ .7 Households who suﬀer
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7. To see why, consider a nominal bond that costs 1/R dollars today and pays $1 tomorrow,
or 1/q  units of consumption, where q  is the price of consumption tomorrow. Now consider
a portfolio of q nominal bonds. The price of the portfolio is 1/R units of numeraire and its
payoﬀ is q/q  1/  units of consumption tomorrow. The model thus determines the price 1/
R of a nominal bond in $.Fig. 4.2 Price-dividend ratios for housing measured with BIS house price indexes
(left scale) and stocks (right scale), together with inﬂation and ex post real ratesFig. 4.2 (cont.) Price-dividend ratios for housing measured with BIS house 
price indexes (left scale) and stocks (right scale), together with inﬂation and ex post
real ratesFig. 4.2 (cont.)from inﬂation illusion do not necessarily associate xwith their expected in-
ﬂation rate.
Every household enters the period with an endowment of goods y, an
endowment of houses h  0, and an amount of goods b  0 from past bond mar-
ket activity. For given market prices p and 1/R, as well as expected payoﬀs
p and x, a household chooses consumption cand c , the quantity of houses
h, and the amount of goods invested in bonds b to solve
(1) max c    c 
c   b   ph   w  (p) :  b  0   ph  0   y
c  (Rx)b   p h,
c, c , h   0,
 b    ph.
This simple setup does not make explicit the utility agents obtain from
housing. One way to interpret it is that housing services and other con-
sumption are perfect substitutes, that the dividend from houses owned
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Fig. 4.3 Price-dividend ratios for housing and stocks measured with data from na-
tional accounts (on the same scale)prior to trading at date 0 is contained in y, and that the date 1 dividend per
unit of house is contained in p . Our analysis holds ﬁxed the dividend from
housing so that changes in the house price p  represent changes in the
price-rent ratio. We normalize the aggregate quantity of houses to 1. The
initial endowment of housing units h  0 thus represents the share of the total
housing stock that is not acquired by households at date 0. We assume that
households must own all houses after trading at date 0. In particular, the
household sector cannot, on aggregate, sell houses to the rest of the econ-
omy. We thus assume h  0   1.
The “rest of the economy” (ROE) sector consolidates the government,
foreign, and business sectors. It may also contain “old” households who do
not plan for the future because date 0 is the last period of their life. The
ROE sells 1 – h  0   0 units of real estate in the housing market and b    0
worth of bonds in the credit market. It also redeems all bonds that house-
holds enter date 0 with (worth b  0). It consumes the proceeds from these
trades:
CROE   p(1   h  0)   b    b  0.
The value of new housing units p(1 – h  0) corresponds to gross residential
investment plus the value of houses sold by “old” households to house-
holds planning for the future at date 0. This interpretation justiﬁes our as-
sumption that h  0   1.
The bond endowment b  0 consists of all payments households receive
from past credit market activity, including interest on bonds held in the
previous period. Household income y comprises labor income and divi-
dends on real estate the household owns before trading at date 0. We as-
sume throughout that the sum of this initial nonhousing wealth is large
enough that the household sector can aﬀord to buy all bonds supplied by
the rest of the economy:
(2) b    b  0   y.
We view this assumption as mild because changes in aggregate household
sector asset positions tend to be small relative to aggregate income, as doc-
umented in Piazzesi and Schneider (2006).
We assume that expectations about payoﬀs on bonds and houses at date
1 are given exogenously. Households agree on the expected payoﬀ from
houses p . However, the perceived payoﬀ x of a nominal bond depends on
households’ understanding of real interest rates. To accommodate these
diﬀerences in perceived bond payoﬀs, we work with a ﬁnite number of
household types, indexed by i. There are  i households of type i, with 
∑i i   1. The market prices of bonds and houses at date 0 are determined
endogenously: 1/R and p, respectively. When choosing portfolios, house-
holds thus agree on the expected real housing return p /p, but they disagree
on the expected real bond return Rxi, the ex ante real rate.
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but expectations about future payoﬀs are exogenously given (as in Grand-
mont 1977). A temporary equilibrium consists of a house price pand an in-
terest rate R together with date 0 consumption and asset choices for the
various types (ci, bi, hi) such that (1) households optimize given their (sub-










 ici   CROE   y.
The market clearing condition for goods illustrates how ROE consumption
accommodates deviations of household consumption from household
income.
4.3.2 Modeling Inﬂation Illusion
Diﬀerences in the subjective bond payoﬀs xi capture how illusionary
and smart investors diﬀer in their perceptions of real rates. We always as-
sume that smart agents expect nominal bonds to pay oﬀ x   1/ . In other
words, smart agents understand the Fisher equation that says that the 
(ex ante) real interest rate equals the nominal interest rate—quoted in the
market—minus the expected inﬂation rate:
(3) real rate   logR   log .
In contrast, agents who suﬀer from inﬂation illusion believe that the
payoﬀ of nominal bonds x is constant. As a result, they view real interest
rates as equal to nominal interest rates up to a constant:
(4) real rate   log R   constant.
In particular, they interpret positive deviations of the nominal interest
rates from its long-run average as an instance of high real rates, and they
interpret unusually low nominal rates as unusually low real rates.
To generate time series predictions, we perform comparative statics ex-
ercises with respect to the distribution of nominal bond payoﬀs xi. In par-
ticular, we compute equilibria for three versions of the model. Our bench-
mark exercise assumes that all agents agree on the same moderate, expected
bond payoﬀ. Intuitively, it captures a time period where expected inﬂation
and the nominal rate are at their long-run averages. While agents in the
model act as if they agree, they do think about interest rates in very diﬀer-
ent terms. Smart agents observe the nominal rate and believe that it reﬂects
moderate inﬂation because of the Fisher equation (3). In contrast, illusion
investors believe that it reﬂects a normal level of the real rate because of
equation (4).
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normal times, it matters when expected inﬂation and nominal rates deviate
from their long-run average. We consider two scenarios where expected
bond payoﬀs diﬀer across agents. Under the 1970s scenario, smart investors
expect high inﬂation and thus believe that bond payoﬀs are lower than av-
erage. However, illusion investors continue to believe that real interest rates
are equal to nominal rates up to a constant. Formally, illusion investors thus
behave as if bond payoﬀs are unchanged from the benchmark. Under the
2000s scenarios, smart investors expect low inﬂation and thus believe that
bond payoﬀs are higher than average. As before, illusion investors act as if
bond payoﬀs have not moved. In both cases, what matters in terms of the
model is disagreement about ex ante real rates. It is thus helpful to ﬁrst an-
alyze a generic case, where some agents expect high bond payoﬀs and oth-
ers expect low bond payoﬀs. This is what we do in the following. We then
use the formal results to discuss the 1970s and 2000s scenarios.
4.4 Equilibrium House Prices and Interest Rates
In this section, we characterize equilibrium prices, ﬁrst for a benchmark
case with identical subjective real rates and then for the case of heteroge-
neous subjective real rates. The latter case is used in the following to argue
that inﬂation illusion induces house price booms when smart investors
have subjective real rates that are either very high or very low.
4.4.1 Solution to the Household Problem
The collateral constraint implies that households cannot borrow against
future income. Instead, borrowing is useful only to set up leveraged port-
folio strategies that increase the return on wealth. To solve problem (1), a
household must, therefore, ﬁrst determine the best portfolio strategy. If the
return on the optimal portfolio is higher than the discount rate  –1, then it
is optimal to invest all date 0 wealth w  . If the best portfolio return is lower
than the discount rate, it is instead optimal to save nothing and simply con-
sume w  at date 0.
Two polar portfolio strategies are available. If the subjective expected re-
turn on bonds, Rxi, is higher than the return on housing, p /p, then the op-
timal portfolio is 100 percent invested in bonds. If the expected bond re-
turn, or equivalently, the expected cost of borrowing, is lower than the
housing return, the best portfolio strategy is to borrow up to the collateral
constraint and invest in housing. For every unit invested in housing, only 
1 –   units must come out of initial wealth because   units can be bor-
rowed. Therefore, the expected return on wealth invested in the leveraged
portfolio—equivalently, the expected return on housing equity—is
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is less than or equal to the discount rate: p /p    –1. For this case, the opti-
mal consumption-savings and portfolio decisions can be summarized as
follows, using two cutoﬀpoints for the real rate Rxi. If Rxi   –1, the house-
hold invests all wealth in bonds; he consumes nothing at date 0 and buys
no houses. If Rxi    –1[p /p – (1 –  ) –1], the household borrows up to the
collateral constraint, invests his own wealth plus all borrowed funds in
housing, and again consumes nothing. Finally, if Rxi is in between the two
cutoﬀs (this is possible whenever p /p   –1), then the household consumes
all wealth at date 0 and does not invest. Finally, at the cutoﬀ points them-
selves, the household is indiﬀerent between neighboring strategies.
4.4.2 Identical Subjective Real Rates
As a benchmark, we consider an equilibrium in which all households
agree on the same ex ante real rate Rx∗. In this case, the expected bond
payoﬀ x∗   1/ * is determined by the inﬂation expectations of smart
agents  ∗. Because both houses and bonds are in positive net supply, the
expected returns on the two assets must be equal and also greater than or
equal to the discount rate. We consider an equilibrium in which there is
some consumption at date t. To make households indiﬀerent between con-
sumption and saving, both returns must equal the discount rate:
(5) Rx∗     1   .
Here the ﬁrst equality is again the Fisher equation: the nominal interest
rate equals the ex ante real rate—here the discount rate—multiplied by the
expected rate of inﬂation  ∗. The second equality says that the house price
is the present discounted value of future payoﬀs, discounted at the real in-
terest rate. In the benchmark equilibrium, the house price is independent
of expected inﬂation.
We assume that initial endowments and asset supplies are such that mar-
kets can clear at these prices. In particular, the supply of assets, with houses
evaluated at the prices p    p  implied by equation (5), must be smaller
than the initial wealth of the household sector:
(6) b     p  b  0    p h  0   y.
Similarly to equation (2), this assumption is also satisﬁed if changes in ag-
gregate household asset positions are small relative to income.
4.4.3 Heterogeneous Subjective Real Rates
We assume that a fraction   of households expects nominal bonds to
have low payoﬀs x  , while a fraction 1 –   of households expects high pay-




162 Monika Piazzesi and Martin Schneiderhouseholds, respectively. To again ensure the existence of equilibria in
which some consumption takes place at date 0, we modify equation (6) to
(7) b     p   b  0    p  h  0   y.
If some new housing units are bought by households planning for the fu-
ture at date 0 (h  0   1), this condition is stronger than equation (6). In the
following equilibria,  p (x  
/x  
) is an upper bound for the house price. The
condition is thus still satisﬁed provided changes in asset positions—in-
cluding investment on housing—are small relative to income.
Proposition 1 characterizes equilibrium prices as a function of the share
  of low-interest households. We know from the benchmark equilibrium
that when households agree on their subjective real rates (that is,   0 or
  1), the Fisher equation holds and the house price is at its benchmark
level  p    p . When households disagree, the nominal rate reﬂects a
weighted average of their payoﬀ expectations. Moreover, suﬃcient dis-
agreement in the population generates a house-price boom (p    p ). The
proposition formally states this result for the case where the maximal loan-
to-value ratio  is suﬃciently large relative to the supply of bonds from the
rest of the economy b  . For low   or high b  , the same type of equilibrium
continues to exist, but it need not be unique. We relegate the analysis of the
latter case to the appendix.
Proposition 1: Prices and the Distribution of Views on Ex Ante Real Rates
Suppose   (b  0   y)   h  0b  . There is a unique equilibrium in which
(a) the nominal interest rate is continuous and nondecreasing in the
fraction   of low-interest agents; there exist cutoﬀs    R and    R such that 1
    R     R   0 and
R     1/x   if      R,
R     1/x   if    
 
R,
R ∈ [  1/x  ,   1/x  ] otherwise.
(b) the house price is hump-shaped in  ; there exists      p ∈ (0,    R) such
that
p    p  if   ∉ (   p,  R),
p    p  otherwise.
Proof: See the appendix.
The pattern of interest rates and house prices is shown in ﬁgure 4.4. To
obtain some intuition, consider ﬁrst an economy where all agents agree on
real interest rates (  0). This economy is in a benchmark equilibrium,
x
   
x  
x
   
x  
Inﬂation Illusion, Credit, and Asset Prices 163where households are indiﬀerent between consumption and savings as well
as between diﬀerent portfolios. Consider now what happens when some
high-interest agents are replaced by low-interest agents, that is,   rises. At
the original prices, the subjective real interest rate of low-interest agents is
below the discount rate and also below the return on housing. Consump-
tion and bonds become unattractive for the low-interest agents: they pre-
fer to invest in housing and also take on mortgages to exploit the low (sub-
jective) cost of borrowing. For small  , this makes little diﬀerence in the
credit market: the high-interest agents, who are indiﬀerent between con-
sumption and bonds, are happy to fund a few more mortgages at the orig-
inal interest rate. Similarly, the house price need not change as long as there
are enough high-interest agents who are willing to sell houses.
The situation changes once there is a critical mass of low-interest agents.
As these agents become more numerous, their total wealth—which they in-
vest in housing equity—goes up. Their demand for houses at the original
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Fig. 4.4 Stylized plot of the equilibrium nominal interest rate R and house price p,
both as functions of the fraction   of low-interest agents who believe that nominal
bonds have low payoﬀs, x  .
Notes: Solid lines are for an initial equilibrium; dotted lines are for an equilibrium with a
higher maximal LTV ratio  .benchmark price  p eventually outpaces the available supply. For markets
to clear, building leveraged portfolios must become less attractive. There
are two ways in which this can happen: the cost of borrowing can rise or the
return on housing can fall. Part (a) of the proposition shows that the for-
mer occurs: the nominal interest rate rises to reﬂect, at least in part, the low
expected bond payoﬀ. Part (b) shows that the house price also reacts: it
goes up in order to lower the expected return on housing. Put diﬀerently,
with suﬃcient disagreement about ex ante real rates, higher housing de-
mand due to cheap mortgages drives up house prices. This occurs even
though everyone agrees that the expected future payoﬀ from houses has
not changed.
To see what happens for high  , consider an economy where all agents
agree on low bond payoﬀs. This economy is again in a benchmark equilib-
rium, but now with a high nominal interest rate reﬂecting the low payoﬀex-
pectations. Assume next that some low-interest agents are replaced by
high-interest agents, that is,   falls. At the original benchmark prices, the
subjective real bond return of the high-interest agents now rises above the
discount rate and the housing return. High-interest agents thus prefer to
invest all wealth in bonds. As long as there are not too many of them, this
does not aﬀect prices: they can easily sell houses and buy bonds at the
benchmark prices. However, once the high-interest agents reach a critical
mass, the nominal interest rate must fall. A lower nominal interest rate not
only reduces the bond demand of the high-interest agents, but it also en-
courages the low-interest agents to take on mortgages, which increases the
supply of bonds. The availability of cheap borrowing in turn increases the
demand for houses from the low-interest agents: we are back in the region
where disagreement increases house prices.
Our ﬁnding that disagreement about ex ante real rates leads to house-
price booms is related to the classic result that, in a market with short sale
constraints and heterogeneous beliefs, assets are valued by the most opti-
mistic investor (Miller 1977).8 The key diﬀerence between our setup and
Miller’s is that we do not assume disagreement about payoﬀs to the boom-
ing asset—in our case, housing—itself. Instead, there is disagreement
about subjective real interest rates. The similarity arises because mortgages
and housing together can be used to form the composite asset housing eq-
uity, deﬁned as housing net of mortgage debt. The collateral constraint im-
plies that housing equity cannot be sold short. Moreover, there is dis-
agreement about its expected payoﬀ p  – bRx. In equilibrium, the value of
housing equity is driven by investors who are most optimistic about its
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8. In the simplest version of Miller’s argument, risk-neutral investors disagree about stock
payoﬀs. If borrowing is allowed, the stock price must make the most optimistic investor indif-
ferent between holding stocks and bonds—if this were not true, the most optimistic investor
would run a leveraged strategy, creating excess demand for stocks. All other investors, who
are prevented from shorting the stock, remain on the sidelines.payoﬀ, that is, the investors who believe in low real bond payoﬀs and,
hence, a low cost of borrowing.
4.4.4 The Role of Collateral
Proposition 2 shows that the possibility of borrowing is critical for our
results and that house-price booms driven by disagreement are stronger
the higher is the leverage ratio.
Proposition 2: The Role of Collateral
Suppose  (b  0   y)   h  0b  .
(a) If   0, the unique equilibrium has p    p .
(b) If     ∗, the house price achieves a maximum at
p ˆ :   p  1       
 1
;
(c) If     ∗, the cutoﬀs    p    p,    R, and    R that govern house price and
interest rate behavior are decreasing in the maximal LTV value  . In par-
ticular, we have
   p( )   (1    ) p /w  ( p ),
   p( )   1   (b       p )/w  ( p ).
Proof: See the appendix.
Part (a) of the proposition says that if the maximal LTV ratio   is equal
to zero—in other words, bond holdings are constrained to be nonnega-
tive—then the house price is constant regardless of the extent of disagree-
ment. In an economy without borrowing, disagreement about real rates
will only be reﬂected in the portfolio positions: low-interest agents perceive
a low return on bonds and hold only houses, while high-interest agents per-
ceive a high return on bonds and hold only bonds. The possibility of lever-
age is thus necessary for disagreement to generate house-price booms. Part
(b) says that when there is suﬃcient leverage—here we focus again on the
case     ∗ that is also considered in Proposition 1—the maximal price p ˆ
that can occur in a house-price boom is increasing in the loan-to-value ra-
tio  . The comparative static of increasing   is represented by the dotted
lines in ﬁgure 4.4.
Part (c) characterizes the cutoﬀ levels for the fraction of low-interest
agents in terms of the maximal LTV ratio  . It says that the cutoﬀs    p and
   p for the house price are decreasing in the maximal leverage ratio   that
borrowers can achieve. At values of   in the interval [   p,    p], there is suﬃ-
cient disagreement such that a house-price boom must occur in any equi-
librium. Higher  means that an individual borrower can issue more bonds
relative to his own wealth and can thus invest a larger multiple of his own
x     x  
166 Monika Piazzesi and Martin Schneiderwealth in housing. The eﬀect on prices is best seen by starting from an equi-
librium with agreement. Suppose ﬁrst that everyone agrees on high real
rates and replace a few agents with low-interest agents, who now become
leverages. Higher demand for houses per individual borrower means that
it takes fewer leveragers to upset the original equilibrium and force an in-
crease in the house price. This explains why the lower bound    p is decreas-
ing in  .
For the converse thought experiment, suppose that initially everyone
agrees on low real rates and then replace a few agents with high-interest
types. At the original equilibrium prices, the high-interest agents invest ex-
clusively in bonds. With higher  , it takes more bond investors to upset the
original equilibrium because low-interest investors can absorb more bond
demand simply by issuing more mortgages, even without an increase in the
house price. Therefore, it takes more bond investors to force a drop in in-
terest rates that ﬁnally leads to an increase in the house price. This explains
why the upper bound    p is also decreasing in  . The upper bound is also
decreasing in the supply of bonds from the rest of the economy. The more
such bonds are outstanding, the less important it is for low-interest in-
vestors to supply additional bonds. It thus again takes more high-interest
types to force a drop in the interest rate.
4.5 House-Price Booms and Inﬂation
To compare the behavior of house prices across decades, consider now
three distinct environments. Let x∗ denote bond payoﬀ expectations in a
normal environment with average inﬂation and nominal rates. As dis-
cussed in the preceding, illusion agents always expect a bond payoﬀx∗and
do not relate it to their expected inﬂation rate. Let xlo   x∗ denote a low
payoﬀthat was expected by smart investors during the 1970s when they ex-
pected inﬂation to be high, xlo   1/ hi. Let xhi   1/ lo   x∗ denote a high
bond payoﬀ that was expected by smart investors in the 2000s when they
expected low inﬂation,  lo    hi. In a normal year, smart investors also ex-
pect a payoﬀ equal (or close) to x∗   1/ ∗. If the two investor types hap-
pen to agree, the economy is simply in a benchmark equilibrium, where the
Fisher equation (for the smart investors) implies a nominal interest rate of
 –1 ∗ and the house price is  p .9
Now consider the 1970s scenario, where smart investors’ inﬂation ex-
pectations jump to  hi    ∗. The price reaction follows from Propositions
1 and 2, setting x   xlo 1/ hiand x   x∗. Suppose that at the relevant pa-
rameters ( ,  ), the economy is in the region described in Proposition 2,
where the nominal interest rate rises above  –1 ∗ but not all the way to 
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9. Even if the agreement is not perfect and the two payoﬀs are simply close, part (b) of
Proposition 1 says that the house price will be close to its benchmark value. –1 hi, while the house price rises above  p . We then obtain an equilibrium
in which a house-price boom coincides with a high nominal interest rate.
When smart investors see the nominal rate, they consider borrowing a
good deal because the nominal rate does not fully reﬂect their high inﬂa-
tion expectations. Their demand for collateral drives up house prices. In
contrast, illusion agents see the nominal rate and believe times are great for
investing in bonds.
Under the 2000s scenario, smart investors’ inﬂation expectations are be-
low the long run average at  lo    ∗. We again read oﬀ prices from Propo-
sitions 1 and 2, now setting x    xhi   1/ lo and x     x∗. If the economy is in
the region where interest rates partially adjust, we obtain a house-price
boom that goes along with low nominal interest rates. Moreover, the role
of the two investor types is now reversed: under the 2000s scenario, it is il-
lusion investors who are eager to borrow as they perceive low real rates.
Illusion investors’ demand for houses thus drives up house prices. In con-
trast, smart investors prefer to invest in bonds.
4.5.1 Structural Change and the Size of House-Price Booms
Changes in the maximal LTV ratio   can be interpreted as the result of
ﬁnancial innovation—for example, in the screening technology available
to intermediaries who originate mortgages. Proposition 2 suggests two
ways in which ﬁnancial development is conducive to housing booms in a
low-inﬂation environment, as under the 2000s scenario. First, part (a) of
the proposition says that higher leverage directly leads to higher house
prices. Second, part (b) says that, with more opportunities for leverage, it
takes fewer inﬂation illusion agents to generate enough disagreement for a
house-price boom.10Taken together, these observations suggest that ﬁnan-
cial development may explain why the house-price booms of the 2000s
were typically stronger than those of the 1970s.
Another consequence of ﬁnancial development is that the fraction of
households who participate in mortgage markets has increased recently,
especially among lower income households (see, for example, Doepke and
Schneider 2006). The model shows that an extreme increase in the partici-
pation rate is conducive to housing booms (  0 and   0 correspond to
a zero and a 100 percent participation rate, respectively). More generally,
one would expect that a smaller increase has similar eﬀects. Moreover, an
inﬂow of poor unsophisticated investors might generate more disagree-
ment about real rates.
Another structural change that occurred between the 1970s and the
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10. Interestingly, the same argument does not apply to illusion-induced booms in high-
inﬂation environments. The discussion after Proposition 2 implies that, in high-inﬂation en-
vironments, higher leverage implies that it takes more illusion investors to generate a boom.2000s is the increased opening of U.S. credit markets to foreigners. Doepke
and Schneider (2006) show that the net nominal asset position of the U.S.-
household sector has reached historical lows in recent years, while for-
eigners have become important net nominal lenders. In our model, this
change is captured by a reduction in the supply of bonds b  provided to the
household sector by the rest of the economy. Proposition 2 shows that
higher b  increases the parameter region where housing booms can occur by
keeping nominal interest rates low even if a lot of investors believe that real
rates are low. Strong foreign demand for bonds thus facilitates housing
booms due to illusion in both high- and low-inﬂation environments.
4.5.2 The Relationship between Inﬂation and Real Estate “Mispricing”
Consider an econometrician whose goal is to decompose house prices
into a “fundamental” and a (residual) “mispricing” component. In the
typical application, the fundamental component is taken to be a risk-
adjusted present discounted value of proﬁts to be made from the housing
stock. If the data were generated by our (risk-neutral) model, correct mea-
surement of rents and real interest rates would thus lead the econometri-
cian to recover the benchmark price  p  as the fundamental component.
The mispricing is then simply p –  p , a series with two peaks that occur
during the 1970s and 2000s. It follows that the relationship between inﬂa-
tion and real estate mispricing is nonlinear: housing booms that push
prices beyond fundamentals occur both at high inﬂation rates (during the
1970s) and at low inﬂation rates (during the 2000s).
If data were generated simply by repeatedly running our model with
diﬀerent inﬂation expectations, an econometrician who regresses his mea-
sure of mispricing on inﬂation should not detect a signiﬁcant relationship.
However, the coeﬃcients in a linear regression could turn out to be (mis-
leadingly) signiﬁcant if there is another factor that changes over time. As
one example, suppose that there is structural change in the credit market,
so that  increases over time, as discussed in the preceding. In this case, the
ﬁrst peak of the real estate mispricing series during the high 1970s inﬂation
is smaller than its second peak during the low 2000s inﬂation. Thus, a lin-
ear regression of mispricing on inﬂation might uncover a signiﬁcantly neg-
ative linear relationship between real estate mispricing and inﬂation. In
this example, the omitted variable “credit market development” will be
responsible for the ﬁnding, although the true relationship between inﬂa-
tion and mispricing is nonlinear.
The relationship between real estate mispricing and inﬂation is also sen-
sitive to how the fundamental component is measured in the face of struc-
tural change. For example, suppose that deregulation of rental markets in-
duces a trend in  p —and, hence, house prices—that has nothing to do
with inﬂation. Consider now an econometrician who determines the fun-
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same mean as the observed house price over his or her sample. Because he
or she ignores the trend in fundamentals, this econometrician will tend to
ﬁnd negative mispricing early in his sample period and positive mispricing
later in the sample period. If inﬂation also happened to decrease over the
sample period, there will be a spurious negative relationship between mis-
pricing and inﬂation that has nothing to do with inﬂation illusion.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has considered a stylized economy with heterogeneous
agents, some of whom suﬀer from inﬂation illusion. Our model predicts a
nonmonotonic relationship between house price-rent ratios and inﬂation:
house prices are high whenever inﬂation is far away from its historical av-
erage. According to the model, a high-inﬂation environment—such as the
1970s—is a time when smart households drive up house prices because
they are able to borrow cheaply from illusionary households. The latter do
not realize that nominal rates are high only because expected inﬂation is
high and thus perceive higher real rates than smart households. In con-
trast, in a low-inﬂation environment—such as the 2000s—the role of the
two groups is reversed: illusionary households drive up house prices be-
cause they think they are borrowing cheaply from smart households. They
do not realize that nominal interest rates are low only because of low ex-
pected inﬂation and thus perceive lower real rates than smart households.
Recent ﬁnancial market development has made borrowing easier, which
might explain why the housing boom of the 2000s is more pronounced than
the 1970s boom.
We emphasize that general equilibrium eﬀects matter for thinking about
the eﬀect of inﬂation illusion on asset prices. While the Fed model consists
of a relationship between endogenous variables, our model jointly deter-
mines both the nominal interest rate and house prices. We have shown that
investor heterogeneity is one way to reconcile the comovement of nominal
rates and inﬂation with real eﬀects of inﬂation illusion and also to avoid
Summers’s critique. An important task for future research is to quantify
the implications of inﬂation illusion and to compare the eﬀect we have de-
rived here to other candidate explanations for house-price booms.
Another interesting issue is the eﬀect of inﬂation illusion on stock prices.
The cross-country evidence in this chapter shows that the price-dividend
ratios of housing and stocks often move in opposite directions. The mech-
anism we emphasize can help produce such negative comovement. Indeed,
disagreement about real interest rates makes bonds more attractive to in-
vestors who perceive high real rates, while it makes real estate more attrac-
tive to investors who perceive low real rates. In relative terms, stocks thus
170 Monika Piazzesi and Martin Schneiderbecome less attractive to both investor types. The resulting shift in portfo-
lio demand away from stocks should thus lower stock prices while increas-
ing house prices.
Appendix
This appendix characterizes the equilibriums of our model. We begin
with three lemmas. Lemma 1 shows that, in any equilibrium, we must have
 –1/x    R    –1/x   and p    p . Lemma 2 derives conditions for the exis-
tence of equilibriums with p    p , while Lemma 3 does the same for the
case p    p . Propositions 1∗ and 2∗ then provide a full description of the
equilibriums that can occur. In particular, these propositions do not as-
sume that  (b  0   y)   h  0b  , an assumption that was made in the text to en-
sure uniqueness. We provide a brief discussion of why multiplicity can oc-
cur—and why it is not particularly interesting from an economic
perspective here—after Proposition 2∗. Finally, we derive Propositions 1
and 2 stated in the text.
Lemma 1: In any equilibrium,  –1/x    R    –1/x   and p    p .
Proof: If R    –1/x  , then no household invests in bonds, which cannot be
an equilibrium because bonds are in positive net supply.
If p    p , then it is optimal for both household types to save all initial
wealth because the real return on housing p /p is higher than the discount
rate. Summing up the market clearing conditions for bonds and houses, the
house price must satisfy
(A1) p   b    b  0   ph  0   y.
Because h  0   1 and condition (2) holds, the solution for p is positive. But
now condition (6) implies that
(A2)       1,
a contradiction.
Finally, if R    –1/x  , the real rate on bonds perceived by both types is
strictly higher than the discount rate, and, because p    p  (by the argu-
ment in the previous paragraph), the real bond return is also strictly
higher than the return on housing. It follows that no agent wants to hold
housing, which cannot be an equilibrium because houses are in positive
net supply. 
p (1   h  0)
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   p   1   (b       p )/w  ( p ),
   p   (1    )  p /w  ( p ).
An equilibrium with p    p  exists if and only if either
(a)      p, in which case Rx      –1, or
(b)      p, in which case Rx     –1.
Proof: We assume ﬁrst that Rx     –1, which leads to case (a) and in the fol-
lowing consider Rx     –1, which leads to case (b). If Rx     –1   p /p, then
high-interest agents hold only bonds. We must have Rx      –1 as otherwise
nobody holds houses. We cannot have Rx      –1. If this were true, low-
interest agents would want to invest all wealth in a leveraged portfolio
strategy. All agents would then invest all wealth so that the value of the to-
tal asset supply would equal the total value of wealth, and the house price
would be determined by equation (A1). As argued in the proof of Lemma
1, condition (6) would then imply p /p   –1 (cf. equation [A2]), which con-
tradicts our assumption that p    p .
We conclude that equilibria with p    p  and Rx     –1 must have Rx    
 –1. Low-interest agents are thus indiﬀerent between bonds, houses, and
consumption, while high-interest agents hold only bonds. Markets can
clear at these prices as long as there are suﬃciently many bonds available
to satisfy the demand of the high-interest agents. Bond supply can come
either from the ROE sector or because low-interest agents issue mortgages.
We obtain the cutoﬀ for case (a):
(A3) b       p  (1    ) ( p h  0   b  0   y).
As long as this inequality holds, condition (6) guarantees that the remain-
ing wealth (owned by the low-interest agents) is high enough such that the
latter agents can aﬀord to purchase the whole housing stock, that is,
(1    ) p   ( p h  0   b  0   y).
Because low-interest agents are indiﬀerent between all portfolio strategies,
a suitable number of them can be assigned to both markets to ensure mar-
ket clearing. It follows that equilibriums with p    p  and Rx     –1 exist if
and only if condition (A3) holds.
Suppose now that Rx      –1. Because Rx      –1   p /p, low-interest
agents will use the leveraged strategy and hold no bonds. For an equilib-
rium of this type to exist, we need the value of the housing stock to be large
enough to satisfy the demand of the low-interest agents, which deﬁnes the
cutoﬀ for case (b):
(A4) (1    ) p   ( p h  0   b  0   y).
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wealth (owned by the high-interest agents) is large enough that the high-
interest agents can absorb all bonds issued by the ROE and the low-interest
agents, that is,
b       p  (1    ) ( p h  0   b  0   y).
It follows that equilibria with p    p  and Rx     –1 exist if and only if con-
dition (A4) holds. 
Lemma 3: An equilibrium with p    p  exists only if   0 and at least one
of four sets of conditions holds:
(a)   h  0b  /(b  0   y) :   ∗ and
   p    1   (b     p ˆ)/w  ( p ˆ),
(b)     ∗ and
   p    1   (b     p ˆ)/w  (p ˆ),
(c)    p    (1 –  )p ˆ/w(p ˆ),
(d)   0 and (1 –  )p ˆ/w  (p ˆ)    1 – (b     p ˆ)/w  (p ˆ).
For all cases, there exist values of   that satisfy the conditions.
Conversely, assume   0. If cases (a) or (b) apply, the equilibrium house
price and interest rate are given by
(A5) p   ,
(A6) R     1     (1    ) .
In case (a), p is decreasing in   and R is increasing in  .
If case (c) applies, then Rx     –1 and
(A7) p   ,
and the price p is increasing in  .
If case (d) applies, p   p ˆ and Rx     –1.
Proof: If p /p   –1, high-interest agents do not own houses in equilibrium.
Indeed, we know from Lemma 1 that we must have Rx      –1. Because 
p /p    –1   Rx  , owning houses without leverage is worse than owning
bonds for high-interest agents. More generally, even the return on a maxi-
mally leveraged strategy is strictly worse than the return on bonds for the
high-interest agents:
 (b  0   y)
  
1      h  0
 p [  h  0(1    )]
   
(1    )(y   b  0)   b  
1
 
 x  
(1    )(b  0   y)   b  
   
  (1    ) h  0
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Because high-interest agents do not own houses, low-interest agents must
be willing to do so, which requires
(A8)      Rx      1.
It follows that we cannot have   0, as otherwise p /p    –1. To derive the
other conditions, we ﬁrst consider Rx     –1, which corresponds to cases (a)
and (b). We then consider Rx     –1, which corresponds to cases (c) and (d).
Cases (a) and (b). We ﬁrst show that if there is an equilibrium with p    p 
and Rx     –1, either case (a) or case (b) applies. If Rx     –1, high-interest
agents invest all their wealth in bonds and hold no houses. We must then
have equation (A8) hold with equality. Indeed, if equation (A8) were to
hold strictly, then low-interest agents would invest all wealth in leveraged
portfolios so that all agents would save all wealth and the house price
would be pinned down by equation (A1). Substituting this price formula
back into equation (A8), we obtain
(A9) b    p ˜   p ˜h  0   y   b  0,
where p ˜    p  (1 –       Rx  )–1. The last inequality contradicts our as-
sumption (7). To see this, deﬁne the function
h(p) :  ,
which is strictly increasing because h  0   1 and b    b  0   y. We can write
equation (A9) as h(p ˜)   1 and equation (7) as h( p x  /x  )   1 so that we
would need p ˜   p  x  /x  . However, Rx     –1 implies p ˜   p ˆ   p x  /x  , a con-
tradiction.
Because (A8) holds with equality, low-interest agents must be indiﬀerent
between consumption and holding leveraged portfolios. There must be a
subset of low-interest agents that holds all houses and issues  pmortgages.
These mortgages, together with the debt issued by the ROE, must in turn
be held by high-interest agents. Because high-interest agents invest all
wealth in bonds, the total outstanding debt must be equal to high-interest
agents’ wealth. For the bond market to clear, the equilibrium house price
must satisfy
(A10) b     p   (1    ) ( ph  0   b  0   y).
The solution for the house price is equation (A5). The interest rate Ris then
pinned down by equation (A8), which we have assumed to hold with equal-
ity. The solution for the interest rate is equation (A6).
b    p
  


















1   
174 Monika Piazzesi and Martin SchneiderThe solutions (p, R) in equations (A5) to (A6) must satisfy p    p  and
Rx      –1. Since they are equilibrium prices, they must also be positive,
which gives rise to two possibilities. Assume ﬁrst that
(A11)  /h  0   (1    )   .
The conditions p    p  and Rx     –1 can now be written as
(A12) b       p  (1    ) ( p h  0   b  0   y),
(A13) b    p ˆ  (1    ) (p ˆh  0   b  0   y),
which deﬁnes the cutoﬀs for   in case (a).
A second set of parameters that leads to positive prices is
(A14) b  /(b  0   y)   (1    )    /h  0.
The conditions p  p and Rx     –1now deﬁne the cutoﬀs for  in case (b):
(A15) b       p  (1    ) ( p h  0   b  0   y),
(A16) b    p ˆ  (1    ) ( p ˆh  0   b  0   y).
It remains to deﬁne
 ∗   h  0 .
We have thus shown that existence of an equilibrium with p    p  and 
Rx     –1 implies either (a) or (b).
We now show that there exist values of   that satisfy these conditions.
Begin with case (a), and consider the function
f(p) :  ,
which is continuously diﬀerentiable with
f (p)   ,
and is, therefore, strictly increasing if and only if    ∗. Conditions (A12)
and (A13) can be written as f(p ˆ)   1 –   f( p). If follows that, if    ∗,
there exist values of   that satisfy both conditions simultaneously. Any
such value of   will also satisfy equation (A11) because
lim
p→ 
f(p)    /h  0   f(p ˆ)   1    f( p )   f(0)   .
A similar argument applies to case (b). Indeed, equations (A15) and (A16)
can be written as f(p ˆ)   1 –   f( p). If     ∗, then f is strictly decreas-
b  
 
b  0   y
 (b  0   y)   b  h  0   
(ph  0   b  0   y)2
b     p
  
ph  0   b  0   y
b  
 
b  0   y
b  
 
b  0   y
Inﬂation Illusion, Credit, and Asset Prices 175ing, which implies that there are values of   that satisfy equations to (A14)
to (A16).
Suppose now that we have a pair ( ,  ) that satisﬁes the conditions of
case (a) or (b), and suppose prices are given by equations (A5) and (A6).
The bond market clears by construction of the house price. For the hous-
ing market to clear, the wealth of the low-interest agents evaluated at p
must be high enough that these agents can aﬀord to hold all houses:
(A17) (1    )p    (ph  
0   b  0   y).
Because equation (A10) is assumed to hold, equation (A17) is equivalent to
b    p   ph  0   b  0   y.
But this inequality is implied by equation (7) because Rx     –1 guarantees
p   p ˆ. If we are in case (a), equation (A11) holds and implies that the price
(A-5) decreasing in  , while the interest rate (A6) is increasing in  .
To sum up, we have shown that an equilibrium with p    p  exists if
either     ∗ and conditions (A12) and (A13) hold or     ∗ and condi-
tions (A15) and (A16) hold. For either case, there are values of   that sat-
isfy the conditions. Finally, if either pair of conditions holds, there is an
equilibrium with prices (A5) and (A6) that satisﬁes p    p .
Case (c). We show that if there is an equilibrium such that p    p , Rx   
 –1and equation (A8) holds with strict inequality, then case (c) applies. Un-
der these conditions, low-interest agents invest all their wealth in a lever-
aged portfolio strategy. Because high-interest agents do not hold houses,
housing equity in the entire housing stock must equal the wealth of low-
interest agents:
(A18) (1    )p    (ph  0   b  0   y).
The solution for the house price is equation (A7).
The solution for p must be positive so that   (1 –  )/h  0. In addition, it
must satisfy p  p as well as equation (A8) with strict inequality. This im-
plies the cutoﬀs for case (c):
(A19) (1    ) p    ( p h  0   b  0   y),
(A20) (1    )p ˆ    ( p ˆh  0   b  0   y).
We now show that there exist values of   that satisfy the conditions of case
(c). The function
g(p) : 
is strictly increasing and continuous in p, with limp→  g(p)   (1 –  )/h  0. It
follows that there exist values of   that satisfy g( p )    g(p ˆ), which is
equivalent to equations (A19) and (A20).
(1    )p
  
ph  0   b  0   y
176 Monika Piazzesi and Martin SchneiderFinally, suppose that there is an   such that equations (A19) and (A20)
hold and that the house price is given by equation (A7). This price is posi-
tive because g is strictly increasing so that equation (A21) implies
  g(p ˆ)   lim
p →  
g(p)   (1    )/h  0.
The house market clears by construction. For the bond market to clear, the
wealth of the high-interest agents must be high enough at p to absorb all
bonds, that is,
(A21) b     p   (1    ) (ph  0   b  0   y).
Because equation (A18) holds, equation (A21) is equivalent to
b    p   ph  0   b  0   y.
This inequality is implied by equation (7) because equation (A8) guarantees
p   p ˆ. We have thus shown that an equilibrium with p    p  and Rx     –1
exists only if equations (A19) and (A20) hold. There are values of   that 
satisfy these conditions. Given the conditions, there is an equilibrium with 
Rx     –1 and house price (A7). The house price is also increasing in  .
Case (d). We show that if there is an equilibrium such that p    p , Rx   
 –1 and equation (A8) holds with equality, then case (d) applies. Substitut-
ing Rx     –1 into equation (A8) and solving for the house price, we obtain
p   p ˆ. Because Rx     –1   p /p, high-interest agents do not hold houses.
Because Rx      –1, low-interest agents do not hold bonds. For the house
market to clear, the wealth of the low-interest agents—evaluated at the
price p ˆ—must be high enough so that these agents can aﬀord the housing
equity required to purchase the entire housing stock:
(A22) (1    )p ˆ    (p ˆh  0   b  0   y).
At the same time, bond market clearing requires that the wealth of the
high-interest agents is high enough so that they can absorb all bonds:
(A23) b     p ˆ   (1    ) (p ˆh  0   b  0   y).
We have thus derived the conditions for case (d). Condition (7) implies that
there exist values of   that satisfy both inequalities. Finally, if there is an  
that falls under case (d), then equation (A22) says that we can pick a sub-
set of the low-interest agents that holds all houses as part of leveraged port-
folios, while equation (A23) says that we can pick a subset of the high-
interest agents who hold all bonds. 
Proposition 1∗:
(a) For every maximal LTV ratio   1, there exist cutoﬀs    R and    R such
that 1     R    R   0, and the equilibrium nominal interest rate satisﬁes
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R     1/x   if      R,
R ∈ [  1/x  ,   1/x  ] otherwise.
(b) For every maximal LTV ratio   ∈ (0, 1), there exist cutoﬀs    p and    p
such that    R     p     p   0, and the equilibrium house price satisﬁes
p    p  if   ∉ (   p,    R],
p    p  if   ∈ (   p,    p),
p ∈ [ p , p ˆ] otherwise.
Moreover, there exists   ∈ (   p,  R) such that there is an equilibrium with 
p   p ˆ.
Proof: We ﬁrst deﬁne the cutoﬀs:
1   (b     p ˆ)/w  (p ˆ) if     ∗,
   R       p if     ∗.
   p if     ∗,
   R    1   (b     p ˆ)/w  (p ˆ) if     ∗.
Part (a). If     ∗, then there is an equilibrium with Rx    –1, by case (a)
of Lemma 2. Lemmas 2 and 3 imply also that there cannot be any other
type of equilibrium. If     ∗, then case (b) of Lemma 3 says that
   R   1   (b     p ˆ)/w  (p ˆ)   1   (b      p )/w  ( p ).
This means that for every      R, there is an equilibrium with Rx      –1,
again by case (a) of Lemma 2. Inspection of the other case in Lemmas 2
and 3 again shows that this is the only equilibrium. Any      R must sat-
isfy the conditions of either case (b) of Lemma 2, or case (c) or case (d) of
Lemma 3. It cannot satisfy the conditions of any other case. In all the rel-
evant cases, the equilibrium interest rate is Rx     –1.
Part (b). For      R, the only equilibrium is that of case (a) of Lemma 2,
which has p    p . If      p, the only type of equilibrium is case (b) of
Lemma 2, which has p  p . If    p      p, then Lemma 2 does not apply.
Comparing the cutoﬀs, one of the cases in Lemma 3 always applies so that
p    p . Finally, for every   0, there exist values of   such that part (d)
of Lemma 3 applies. In the latter equilibrium, p   p ˆ.
Proposition 2*:
(a) If borrowing is not possible (  0), then p    p  for all  .
(b) The cutoﬀs    p    p,    R, and  R that govern house price and interest rate
behavior are decreasing in the maximal LTV value  . In particular, we have
178 Monika Piazzesi and Martin Schneider   p( )   (1    ) p /w  ( p ),
   p( )   1   (b       p )/w  ( p ).
(c) There is a threshold for the maximal LTV ratio  ∗ :  h  0b  /(b  0   y) ∈
(0, 1) such that
(i) if   ∈ ( ∗, 1), equilibrium is unique for all   and
   p( )     R( )     R ( )     p ( ).
The interest rate is continuous and nondecreasing in the fraction  ,
whereas the house price is continuous and hump-shaped in  , with a maxi-
mum of p   p ˆ.
(ii) if   ∈ (0,  ∗), then
   R( )     p( )     R ( )      p ( ).
For      p( ), the interest rate and house price are continuous and nonde-
creasing in the fraction  . If      R( ), then Rx      –1 and p    p . If 
  ∈ [   p( ),    R( )], there can be up to three equilibriums with R ∈ [ –1/x  , 
 –1/x  ] and p ∈ [ p , p ˆ].
Proof: Part (a). If   0, then Lemma 3 does not apply. The result follows
directly from Lemma 2.
Part (b). The formulas for    p and    p follow directly from the proof of
Proposition 1. These cutoﬀs are decreasing in   because w  is positive and
does not depend on  . To show that    p and    p are also decreasing in  , it is
suﬃcient to show that (b    p ˆ)/w  (p ˆ) is increasing in  . The derivative
 
is positive because equation (7) guarantees w  (p ˆ)   b    p ˆ and h0,   and x  /x  
are all smaller than one.
Part (c). Our assumption equation (2) can be written as
w  ( p )   b     p  ,
and, therefore, implies that    p     p for all  . Case (c) of Lemma 3 implies
that    R     p for all  .
If    ∗, the conditions of Lemmas 2 and 3 are mutually exclusive, and
exactly one case of Lemma 3 can be relevant for a given value of  . Equi-
librium is thus unique. Moreover, Lemma 3 implies that the price is in-
creasing in   in case (c) and decreasing in case (a). Comparing the price
formulas shows that the price is continuous and hump-shaped. Similarly,
case (a) of Lemma 3 says that the interest rate is increasing, while it is con-
stant in all other cases. Comparison of the formulas shows that the interest
rate is also continuous.
w  (p ˆ)   [1   (x  /x  )] h  0 (b    p ˆ )
    
1      (x  /x  )
p ˆ
 
w  (p ˆ)2
d [(b    p ˆ)/w  (p ˆ)]
   
d 
Inﬂation Illusion, Credit, and Asset Prices 179If    ∗,    R    pfollows from case (b) of Lemma 3. Unless  ∈[   p,    R],
exactly one of the cases in Lemma 3 applies so that equilibrium is unique.
If   ∈ [   p,    R], then case (a) of Lemma 2 as well as cases (b) and (c) of
Lemma 3 can in principle all apply. Therefore, there can be up to three
equilibriums. 
Remarks
If   is low, multiple equilibria can obtain for some intermediate values
of   (case [ii]). This happens because, with risk neutrality, portfolio choice
reacts to prices only through discrete jumps, while the eﬀect of prices on
wealth is continuous. Consider again the thought experiment where ini-
tially all agents agree on real rates and then some are replaced by high-
interest types. For high  , bond demand is due to high-interest agents,
whose wealth is increasing in the house price. At the same time, the supply
of bonds comes in part from borrowing by low-interest agents. Locally, the
latter also increases with the house price, as the borrowing constraint is re-
laxed. Both supply and demand are locally not sensitive to the interest rate.
Markets can then clear both at a high house price, which give rises to high
supply and demand, and at a low house price, which gives rise to low supply
and demand.11 Because this multiplicity is due to auxiliary assumptions
and does not aﬀect the main eﬀect we emphasize—house-price booms oc-
cur for intermediate values of  —we do not use it in our interpretation of
the following model.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 establishes the existence of cutoﬀs for price and interest
rates in any equilibrium. Under the additional assumption     ∗   h0b/
(b0   y), part (c, i) of Proposition 2∗ shows uniqueness, the special form of
the cutoﬀs, as well as the monotonicity of the interest rate and the hump
shape of the house price. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Part (a) is the same as part (a) of Proposition 2∗. Part (b) follows from
part (a) of Proposition 1∗.
Part (c) follows from part (c, i) of Proposition 2∗. 
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11. If ϕ is higher, bond supply becomes more sensitive to the interest rate and equilibrium
is unique. The same is true if the exogenous bond supply b  is smaller; in fact, ϕ∗   0 if b    0.
In addition, equilibrium is unique if bond demand becomes less sensitive to the house price
as h  0 falls; we have ϕ∗   0 also if h  0   0.References
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Comment Markus K. Brunnermeier
The fact that the house price-rent ratio—a real measure of house price fun-
damentals—covaries with the nominal interest rate rather than the real in-
Inﬂation Illusion, Credit, and Asset Prices 181
Markus K. Brunnermeier is a professor of economics at Princeton University, and a re-
search associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.terest rate is one of the many puzzles in real estate economics. Increases in
the nominal interest rate, which may be completely caused by increases in
inﬂation, depress the house price-rent ratio.
A similar negative correlation between inﬂation and stock prices
prompted Modigliani and Cohn (1979) to conjecture that investors are
prone to money illusion: they confuse nominal and real interest rates.
When that is the case, investors mistakenly discount real future cash ﬂows
with the nominal interest rate (or, alternatively, ignore the fact that cash
ﬂows tend to grow in nominal terms as inﬂation rises). Consequently, the
price-earnings ratio of stocks negatively comoves with inﬂation.
Initially, Modigliani and Cohn’s money illusion hypothesis did not seem
to apply to the housing market since—as Summers (1983) pointed out—
in the early 1970s, house prices were high even though inﬂation was rising.
However, over a longer time series, there seems to be clear evidence that in-
ﬂation depresses the house price-rent ratio even after controlling for fun-
damental factors that determine house prices (see Brunnermeier and Jul-
liard 2008). This naturally leads to the question: what was diﬀerent in the
United States in the early 1970s.
The authors of this chapter provide a fresh perspective on this puzzle.
They argue that money illusion can also explain house-price movements in
the 1970s because it is not the level of inﬂation that matters, but the level of
disagreement on inﬂation between rational investors and investors who
suﬀer from money illusion. As inﬂation rises, rational households would
like to short long-term nominal bonds, that is, borrow money (if the nom-
inal rate does not adjust fully). However, in order to do so, they have to buy
real estate as collateral. The authors argue that this mechanism led to an
increase in housing demand by rational investors in the 1970s. This is in
contrast to the late 1990s, when investors that were prone to money illusion
boosted demand for housing.
To make this point precisely, the authors propose a very tractable two-
period model. Agents derive utility from a single consumption good in
both periods. Because agents’ utility is linear, we can alternatively think of
a model in which consumption only occurs in the last period, but house-
holds can “store” wealth for one period with a storage return of 1/ . In ad-
dition to storage, agents can transfer wealth in two ways. They can buy a
bond that pays a real interest rate of R/ or, alternatively, they can buy real
estate. For simplicity, the authors consider housing as pure investment
good and abstract from any service ﬂow housing provides. House prices in
period one are exogenously ﬁxed to be the constant p .
In summary, in a frictionless world, agents have three ways to transfer
wealth from period zero to the consumption period one. (See table 4C.1.)
Of course, in a world without frictions and homogeneous beliefs, no-
arbitrage guarantees that R/  1/  and p    p .
To make the model interesting, the authors introduce heterogeneous be-
182 Monika Piazzesi and Martin Schneiderliefs about the real bond return, R/ . Rational agents have correct beliefs,
while agents that are prone to money illusion have a distorted view of the
real interest rate. They believe that inﬂation is always at some benchmark
level, for example, 4 percent.
The heterogeneity in beliefs about the real interest rate leads to trading
activity in the bond market. Whenever investors with money illusion un-
derestimate the real interest rate, they sell the bond, while rational in-
vestors buy it. Without any further assumptions, investors’ risk-neutrality
would imply that they trade an inﬁnite amount of bonds, and the housing
market would be a complete side show.
What makes the model interesting are two constraints: (1) a collateral
constraint that implies that one can only short bonds (borrow money) if
one owns a house as collateral and (2) a short-sale constraint for housing.1
When inﬂation is low, money illusion investors underestimate the real in-
terest rate and buy houses because they seem relatively cheap, while ra-
tional investors cannot short-sell houses. This is the standard eﬀect of
money illusion also studied in Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008). On the
other hand, when inﬂation is high, investors that suﬀer from money illu-
sion mistakenly think that the real interest is high and buy bonds. Rational
investors realize that the bond price is too high and want to short it. In or-
der to do so, they have to buy houses as a collateral. This, together with the
shorting restrictions that irrational investors face, leads to excessively high
house prices. The authors claim that this mechanism explains the increase
in the house price-rent ratio in the 1970s. My comments are the following:
Inﬂation Disagreement or Violation of Fisher Equation
What makes this analysis diﬀerent from earlier work on money illusion
is that the eﬀects are primarily driven by disagreement among rational in-
vestors and investors who are prone to money illusion. While an extreme
form of money illusion in which agents never change their belief about in-
ﬂation predicts a (downward sloping) monotonic relationship between 
inﬂation and the mispricing in the housing market, this chapter predicts a 
U-shaped pattern. Housing prices are excessively high whenever investors
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1. While the plausibility of short-sale constraints is ﬁercely debated for the stock market
(see, e.g., Battalio and Schultz 2006), it seems uncontroversial for the housing market.
Table 4C.1 Payoﬀ matrix: Possible wealth transfers from time t   0 to time t   1.
t   0 t   1
Storage (analogy) –   1
Bond –1  R/ 
Housing –p  p disagree about future inﬂation forecasts. This occurs when inﬂation is
either very low (late 1990s)—because irrational investors predict inﬂation
to be too high—but also when inﬂation is very high (as in 1970s)—because
the irrational investors’ inﬂation forecast is too low. To check the plausi-
bility of this assumption, it seems natural to look at inﬂation forecast sur-
vey data. There are three main surveys of inﬂation forecasts. The Survey of
Professional Forecasters and the Livingston Survey elicit inﬂation expec-
tations of professional forecasters working for the ﬁnancial industry.
Unlike the former two, the Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes and
Behavior focuses on individual households and, hence, seems the most 
appropriate one as this model attempts to capture not only rational fore-
casters but also households that are prone to money illusion. Mankiw,
Reis, and Wolfers (2004) provide an interesting analysis of inﬂation expec-
tations. Their study shows, among other things, that disagreement—mea-
sured by the interquartile range—slightly leads the median inﬂation ex-
pectation and steadily declines from 1983 onward, with the exception of a
blip in the early 1990s. Overlaying the plot with the house price-rent ratio
shows that the disagreement explanation of this chapter does a very good
job for the 1970s, but is less convincing for the house-price frenzy that
started in the late 1990s (see ﬁg. 4C.1).
However, simply looking at disagreement measures of inﬂation forecasts
does not do full justice to this model because money illusion can take on
very subtle forms. It might very well be that individuals—when asked—
have a good estimate of inﬂation, but nevertheless fail to distinguish be-
tween nominal and real mortgage interest rates. Put diﬀerently, it is quite
plausible that money illusion reﬂects a failure of the Fisher equation—
agents may ignore that real interest rates are roughly equal nominal inter-
est rates minus inﬂation—rather than a biased inﬂation forecast. Hence,
with a slight reinterpretation, the authors’ mechanism may still be com-
pelling.
An Alternative Hypothesis for 1970s
Another unusual feature of the 1970s is that the house price-rent ratio—
unlike in other periods—negatively comoves with the real mortgage inter-
est rate. The price-rent ratio in the 1970s is above its trend when real mort-
gage rates are low (or even negative) and below its trend when real
mortgage rates are high. This observation is consistent with the following
alternative hypothesis: a sharp increase in inﬂation alerts households such
that they subsequently correctly take inﬂation eﬀect into account and fo-
cus on the real interest rate. On the other hand, a gradual change in inﬂa-
tion can easily go by unnoticed by a fraction of households. This alterna-
tive hypothesis suggests that, in the 1970s, the hedging aspect of housing
against inﬂation risk and especially the tax-deductability of mortgage in-
terest payments were driving housing demand. The fact that nominal


























































































































































































































































































































































































































.mortgage interest payments are tax-deductible creates a huge incentive to
buy a house and borrow money when inﬂation is high, an eﬀect that was
widely discussed at that time. It is, therefore, not surprising that house
prices boomed (as emphasized in Poterba [1984] and Titman [1982]). Note
also that this alternative hypothesis would also square nicely with Ami-
hud’s (1996) ﬁnding that the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis does not hold
for the Israeli stock market. High inﬂation in Israel may have alerted in-
vestors to the diﬀerence between nominal and real interest rates.
Loan-to-Value-Ratio
When disagreement is high, that is, when either inﬂation is very high or
fairly low, agents would be willing to leverage their housing investment
more. One might, therefore, guess that the loan-to-value ratio should be
higher in the 1970s and late 1990s. However, Japelli and Pagano (1989,
1994) and Almeida, Campello, and Liu (2006) document an average loan-
to-value ratio of 89 percent for the 1980s, which exceeds the 80 percent
value registered in both the 1970s and 1990s. Because there are many
caveats attached to these numbers, a more elaborate study of real estate
leverage would be desirable. Of course, it might also be that banks act ra-
tionally and limit credit whenever real estate is overpriced, therefore re-
ducing the average loan-to-value ratio.
Role of Intermediaries
There are no intermediaries in the model, even though they play a sig-
niﬁcant role in the mortgage market. Their importance was even more pro-
nounced in the 1970s, before mortgages were securitized. While in the
model irrational investors take the other side of the mortgage contract in a
high inﬂation environment, in the 1970s, the banking sector, especially
thrifts, took on a large part of the inﬂation risk. As inﬂation spiked, banks
seemed to have lost a large fraction of their value because they issued mort-
gages that were partially ﬁnanced by short-term demand deposits (see, e.g.,
White 1991). Even though some thrifts were arguably poorly managed, I
ﬁnd it more plausible that professional bank managers were surprised by
the inﬂation spikes and inadequately hedged rather than prone to money
illusion.
Possible Extensions
The model could be extended in a variety of ways to gain further insights
into the mechanism. Departing from the linear utility function speciﬁca-
tion would enrich the model in two ways. First, it would give housing a role
as a hedge against inﬂation risk. Second, varying the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution can cause interesting wealth and feedback eﬀects.
Another possibility to augment the model is to allow for disagreement
about future house prices. The authors abstract from this by assuming that
the future house price is ﬁxed at p . If agents were to disagree about the fu-
186 Monika Piazzesi and Martin Schneiderture house price p , current house prices would also increase in this dis-
agreement measure. The reasoning is analogous to Miller (1977): optimists
push up house prices, while pessimists cannot push them back down be-
cause they face short-sale constraints.
Overall, the chapter provides a very interesting U-shaped relation be-
tween the price-rent ratio and inﬂation by combining money illusion and
disagreement about inﬂation with realistic collateral constraints and short-
sale constraint on housing. The authors’ focus on disagreement about in-
ﬂation forecasts provides a novel explanation of why we observed relatively
high house prices in the 1970s when inﬂation was high.
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Discussion Summary
Martin Schneider responded to Brunnermeier’s discussion by saying that
the authors had wanted to incorporate heterogeneity because it appeared
that nominal interest rates respond strongly to inﬂation. In a framework
Inﬂation Illusion, Credit, and Asset Prices 187with a representative agent subject to inﬂation illusion, this would not be
the case. Schneider also argued that it was not possible to identify the pro-
portion of people subject to inﬂation illusion from surveys. Finally, he said
that the results of the quantitative model were included in the chapter pri-
marily to convince people that the eﬀects highlighted in the chapter could
be quantitatively important.
Stephen G. Cecchetti said that he was surprised that high nominal inter-
est rates were associated with high house prices because mortgage qualiﬁ-
cations related to nominal rates: that is, ϕ, the parameter that drives the re-
sults when people disagree, was decreasing in the nominal interest rate.
Schneider replied that he thought that ﬁnancial innovation had helped to
amplify this eﬀect.
Martin Feldstein said that he thought the tax treatment of mortgage in-
terest payments is an important factor for house prices. The government
focuses on nominal interest rates for the purpose of deductions, so when in-
ﬂation is high, the after-tax real interest rate decreases. This, he suggested,
drives much of the variation in house prices. Piazzesi agreed and said that
the authors were addressing the issue in a companion paper.
Donald L. Kohn said that if inﬂation illusion were responsible for the
housing-price boom, one might expect to see less of a boom in inﬂation-
targeting countries than in the United States. But that was not the case. He
suggested that this cast doubt on the chapter’s hypothesis and that it might
be instead that irrational investors in housing merely extrapolate past cap-
ital gains forward. If the argument of the chapter were correct, however, it
would make it harder for monetary policymakers to respond to house-
price bubbles because changes in interest rates and inﬂation would worsen
disagreement among investors and increase housing demand.
Marvin Goodfriend responded to Kohn that there is an identiﬁcation
problem: central banks may choose to target inﬂation because they lack
credibility. In this case, disagreement about inﬂation may be just as severe
in inﬂation-targeting countries. Goodfriend also said that more ﬂexible
monetary policy, with multiple goals, may lead the central bank to lose
control of investor beliefs about inﬂation and that the chapter provides an
example of a real distortion that can arise from such a loss of control.
Simon Gilchrist said that it would be important to look for direct evi-
dence for the increased dispersion of beliefs relied upon by this model and
others like it.
John C. Williams pointed out that the house price-rent ratio had in-
creased greatly in recent years and that this run-up was not uniform over
the United States but rather was concentrated on the coasts. If so, the
model asked us to believe that people on the coasts were most subject to il-
lusion. Schneider replied that he thought that supply considerations could
explain this fact: in the center of the country, supply expanded to meet de-
mand, while on the coasts, supply was ﬁxed.
188 Monika Piazzesi and Martin SchneiderAndrew Levin said that the reason that the original inﬂation illusion lit-
erature had not focused on housing prices was because the tax eﬀect was so
obvious: there was a huge beneﬁt to housing investors from the fact that
tax deductions were based on nominal rates. Schneider agreed that the tax
eﬀect was ﬁrst-order. But he argued that the disagreement eﬀect was also
ﬁrst-order; in the authors’ other paper, they found that the two eﬀects were
of comparable magnitudes. Brunnermeier said that his paper with Julliard
ﬁnds a substantial eﬀect of money illusion on housing prices, and this
eﬀect can be rationalized through the tax channel because money illusion
and interest rate deductability have opposite eﬀects on housing prices.
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